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Abstract 
With liberalization in 1998, numerous firms have entered the German retail electricity 
market, including newly formed cooperatives. Based on Transaction Cost Economics, 
we develop a theoretical framework seeking to explain preferences for electricity 
supplied by cooperatives from a consumer perspective. Drawing on a convenience 
sample of 287 German electricity consumers and Choice Experiment data from an 
online survey, we estimate Willingness-to-Pay values for organizational attributes of 
electricity suppliers, while accounting for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. 
Consumers in the sample exhibit a large Willingness-to-Pay for renewable energy. Our 
results also indicate a substantial Willingness-to-Pay for transparent pricing, 
participation in decision making, and local suppliers. Democratic decision making – a 
distinct feature of cooperatives – exhibits positive Willingness-to-Pay values for 
approximately one fifth of the sample. Taken together, our findings suggest a slightly 
higher Willingness-to-Pay for electricity produced by cooperatives. Limitations of 
applied sampling and other important aspects of energy transition are also discussed. 
Keywords: Choice Experiments; Cooperatives; Energy Transition 
JEL Codes: C25; D12; Q41 
1 Introduction 
Over the past 15 years, German electricity supply has undergone significant changes, 
and a large number of new firms have entered the retail market (Bundesnetzagentur 
2012; Jansen 2012; Bontrup and Marquardt 2010), including cooperatives that are 
generally distinguished from publicly-owned or investor-owned firms (IOF). 
Consequently, today numerous German electricity suppliers not only differ in terms of 
prices, offered services, or energy mix, but also regarding how they are organized (i.e. 
their governance structures).  
Empirical research on energy cooperatives in Germany has largely focused on 
practitioner problems and the production side (Flieger and Klemisch 2008; Menke 
2009; Klemisch and Maron 2010; Holstenkamp and Ulbrich 2010; Degenhart 2010; 
Müller and Rommel 2011; Müller and Holstenkamp 2012, Holstenkamp and Müller 
2013), but rarely on the role of consumers. Theory-wise, a consumer perspective on 
the organization of enterprise can be built on Williamson’s (1985) argument that 
opportunistic and boundedly rational agents may require safeguards for organizing 
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transactions. Controlling for other important characteristics of electricity (e.g. 
renewable energy share), we developed a Choice Experiment (CE) to estimate 
consumer preferences and subsequent Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) values for 
governance attributes of electric utilities. In a CE, respondents take part in a survey 
and repeatedly choose between two or more alternatives describing the good to be 
valued, separated into its characteristics, generating data that can be used to estimate 
welfare measures for changes in attributes. 
We included several governance attributes in our CE, such as decision-making 
structures and commitment to price transparency, which may help consumers to reduce 
transaction costs resulting from challenges present on electricity markets, such as 
monopolistic structures in generation and transmission or information asymmetries. 
Our study focuses on Cooperative Governance as a means to economize on transaction 
costs (Hansmann 1996; Müller and Rommel 2011), seeking to understand the recent 
success of electricity-supply cooperatives from the consumer side of the transaction, 
especially in markets for renewable energy. Our study is explorative in nature, as the 
topic has not been researched so far. Hence, we relied on a small non-probability 
sample from students and employees at different universities to assure environmental 
awareness and high education standards.  
This paper is organized as follows. First, we develop a theoretical framework for 
analyzing Cooperative Governance in retail electricity markets and then describe our 
empirical approach, followed by presentation and discussion of results. The last 
section offers a summary and concludes. Background and Theoretical Framework  
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2 Energy Transition and Cooperatives 
The liberalization of electricity markets in 1998, in combination with the Erneuerbare 
Energien Gesetz (Renewable Energy Act) and the start of nuclear phase-out in 2002, 
set the framework for a process which is referred to as an Energiewende (energy 
transition) among the German public.1 Some of its most visible outcomes have been 
technical change (e.g. decentralized renewable-energy power plants), a retail market 
for renewable energy, and electric utilities competing for ways to promote further 
development of this energy transition vis-à-vis their customers (Kaenzig et al. 2013).2 
It is, thus, not surprising that much recent research on consumer electricity preferences 
has focused on WTP for renewable energy (e.g. Roe et al. 2001; Borchers et al. 2007; 
Scarpa and Willis 2010; Álvarez-Farizo and Hanley 2002; Dimitropoulos and 
Kontoleon 2009; Meyerhoff et al. 2010; (Michelsen and Madlener 2012)).  
Electricity from renewable energy sources has characteristics strongly resembling 
from credence goods. Consumers cannot, for example, easily ascertain the effect of its 
consumption on their utility, and electric utilities may use tariffs for renewable energy 
to hide margins, resulting from information asymmetries and opportunistic behavior 
(Akerlof 1970; Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
Historically, successful cooperatives have been explained by their ability to help 
members overcome economic misery (Müller 1976; Gros 2009), the social network 
created among members, most prominently displayed in a cooperative’s 
1 A detailed analysis of the legal aspects, such as the Renewable Energy Act, technical change, and its 
relationship to the recent rise of electricity cooperatives, is beyond the scope of this paper. For more 
information see Müller and Rommel (2011). 
2 In many Western countries, consumer preferences have changed over the last decades. For a relatively 
small but growing part of the population, social and environmental impacts of consumption choices 
play an increasingly important role. A recent overview on this phenomenon can be found in Seyfang 
(2009).  
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Genossenschaftsgeist (cooperative spirit; Draheim 1955), or their contribution to 
competitive pricing under imperfect competition (Hanisch et al. forthcoming). One 
could argue today that increased consumer demand for electricity from cooperatives 
reflects their self-help character: people support cooperatives because there seems no 
other way to make nuclear power plants obsolete and achieve a sustainable energy 
system. Social networks may also explain consumer support, because cooperatives 
provide space for communication and activities to people with similar attitudes. In 
contrast to IOFs, whose owners share the goal of maximizing profits, cooperatives, by 
definition (ICA 2012), seek to advance their members’ economic, social, and cultural 
goals through a jointly owned and democratically controlled organization.  
The user-owner identity in cooperatives leads to an alignment of interests, resulting in 
higher levels of transparency and lower regulation costs. Cooperatives can more easily 
ensure price transparency, reducing uncertainties related to the credence-good 
character of renewable energy (Müller and Rommel 2011). In contrast to the 
approaches mentioned already, these facets are quite explicitly taken into account by 
the Transaction Cost Economics literature on cooperatives (Bonus 1986; Hansmann 
1996; Chaddad and Iliopoulos 2013). 
2.1 Transaction Cost Economics and Cooperative Governance  
Based on the seminal work of Coase (1937), Transaction Cost Economics has argued 
that economic transactions are associated with costs exceeding production costs. Net 
utility derived from economic transactions cannot be understood solely by looking at 
prices, but must also be evaluated against knowledge of how transactions are organized 
(Coase 1937, 1960; Williamson 1985). Transaction costs are added to those for 
production and consumption, occurring for example when actors negotiate and design 
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contracts or safeguard transactions. Agents can economize by finding optimal 
governance systems for organizing transactions (Williamson 1985). Governance can 
be broadly defined as institutions at contractual or organizational levels which can be 
shaped by actors involved in transactions (Williamson 1991).  
Cooperative governance is distinct from that of publicly owned utilities and IOFs. In 
spite of the diverse governance models existing within the cooperative sector 
(Chaddad and Cook 2004; Cornforth 2004; Theurl and Kring 2002), common features 
can be found across it which are most prominently reflected in cooperative principles 
(see also Laurinkari 1994; ICA 2012) that form the core of cooperative governance. 
These principles include (1) voluntary and open membership; (2) democratic control; 
(3) economic participation; (4) autonomy and independence; (5) education, training, 
and information; (6) concern for community; and (7) cooperation of cooperatives.  
Historically, electricity markets have been dominated by monopolistic structures, 
dating back to the natural monopoly of the grid and its associated regulation costs 
(Baumol 1977). In a cooperative, profits and losses are typically distributed 
proportionately to patronage (economic participation). Thus, relatively high/low prices 
would result in profits/losses being attributed to user-owners proportionate to the 
amount of services received, aligning interests of users and owners and lowering 
regulation costs (Hansmann 1996). Although today integrated monopolists are 
unbundled and the natural monopoly is confined to the grid, customers are confronted 
with the market power of former monopolists in electricity generation 
(Bundesnetzagentur and Bundeskartellamt 2013). By becoming cooperative members, 
customers can participate in its democratic decision making.  
Credence good characteristics of electricity generation result from high information 
costs. Cooperatives are typically embedded in local economic structures which can 
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reduce information and enforcement costs through peer pressure or higher levels of 
trust (Granovetter 1985; Bonus 1986). An overview of the challenges observed on 
electricity markets and their cooperative governance solutions is listed in Table 1.  
Table 1: Challenges and Cooperative Governance Solutions on Electricity 
Markets 
Challenge on Electricity 
Market 
Cooperative Governance 
Solution 
Key Reference 
Monopolistic market 
structures 
Participation and democratic 
control, reducing regulation costs 
Hansmann (1996) 
Energy transition and 
sustainable consumption 
Activity space for 
commitment/initiatives, reducing 
information costs 
Müller and 
Rommel (2011) 
Electricity (from 
renewables) as a credence 
good 
Transparency; local suppliers 
embedded in social networks, 
reducing enforcement and 
information costs 
Bonus (1986) 
  
Empirically, few studies have tried to quantify WTP for organizational attributes in 
the environmental valuation literature. Remoundou et al. (2012) analyzed whether 
WTP for environmental protection depends on the providing authority. Bougherara 
and Ducos (2006) directly included governance attributes into a CE on contracts 
between the European Union and farmers. Reise et al. (2012) studied farmers’ 
contracts. In analyzing supply relationships with biogas plants, the authors included 
contract duration and contracting partner as attributes in a CE. Abebe et al. (2013) 
study preferences for different contract farming settings of smallholders in Ethopia. 
Applying a CE, they use the organizational form of the contractor and details of the 
contract as attributes. Two studies used Stated Preferences methods related to 
electricity and cooperatives (Hanisch et al. 2010; Rommel et al. 2010). Hanisch et al. 
(2010) found that about a third of the respondents would support cooperative 
6 
 
arrangements in energy supply. Applying a CE, Rommel et al. (2010) investigated 
preferences regarding electricity sector reforms, with only a small sample subgroup 
preferring electricity from a cooperative. 
These theoretical considerations and empirical results have guided the selection of 
attributes for our CE, which we now turn to. 
3 Choice Experiments and Experimental Design 
3.1 Background 
According to the household production framework developed by Lancaster (1966) and 
Rosen (1974), consumers derive utility from characteristics of a good, rather than from 
the good itself. For example, utility from wine consumption may stem from taste, 
color, or alcohol content. CEs employ this approach, incorporating such attributes as 
“utility-sensitive” elements. 
Thurstone (1927) laid the ground for random utility models by formally deriving the 
effect of different stimuli – good characteristics or attributes – on perceived ratings, 
meaning preferences or choice probabilities. He also stressed that humans are much 
better in comparing alternatives than in judging them individually. The model was 
formalized by Manski (1977); McFadden (1974) then combined these approaches and 
developed a statistical model, based on which Louviere and Woodworth (1983) 
conducted the first CE. 
3.2 The Formal Model 
We assume that individuals can derive utility from consumption of alternative 
electricity-supply contracts, depending on their attributes, choosing the one with the 
highest level of utility.  We assume a linear indirect utility function 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 and a linearly 
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added identical and independent distributed (iid) extreme value type 1 error term, ɛ𝑖𝑖, 
with the cumulative distribution function 𝐹𝐹(ɛ𝑖𝑖) = exp (− exp(ɛ𝑖𝑖)) for each 
alternative 𝑖𝑖, so that the probability of choosing alternative 𝑗𝑗 is given by 
(1) Pr{𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑗𝑗} = Pr {𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗�𝑨𝑨𝑗𝑗 ,𝑦𝑦 − 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑨𝑨𝑗𝑗� + ɛ𝑗𝑗  > 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖(𝑨𝑨𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑨𝑨𝑖𝑖, ) + ɛ𝑖𝑖  ∀𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗} 
where 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗  and 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 are the attribute vectors of alternative 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 and 𝑦𝑦 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 is the 
budget constraint or the price of the alternative. 
Some manipulation will lead to McFadden’s (1974) conditional logit (CL) probability, 
which is 
(2)  Pr{𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑗𝑗} =  exp (𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗)
∑ (exp (𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖)𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  
The linear indirect utility function for alternative j is 
(3)  𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗 = 𝜷𝜷𝑨𝑨𝑗𝑗 
where 𝜷𝜷 is a parameter vector to be estimated so that  
(4)   Pr{𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑗𝑗} =  exp (𝜷𝜷𝑨𝑨𝒋𝒋)
∑ (exp (𝜷𝜷𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊)𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  . 
With the following specification, the maximum likelihood method can be used to 
estimate 𝜷𝜷. 
The CL model has some restrictions. First, the iid assumption implies that adding new 
irrelevant alternatives will not change the current substitution pattern, which is known 
as the Irrelevance of Independent Alternatives assumption. Second, the CL model 
assumes homogeneity of respondents. That is, apart from the unobserved iid random 
deviation, all respondents have identical preferences.   
A large number of CL model extensions exist (Louviere et al. 2000) that relax the iid 
assumption and allow incorporation of scale and preference heterogeneity into 
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estimation. Prominent examples include the nested, random parameters and latent 
class logit (LCL) models. The LCL is an extension of the CL model, as it endogenously 
estimates preference classes, that is, finite discrete distributions of preferences. Each 
class has individual parameter vectors 𝜷𝜷𝑠𝑠, where 𝑜𝑜 indicates the class. Parameters for 
each class are estimated with separate CL models: 
(5)   Pr{𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑗𝑗|𝑜𝑜} =  exp (𝜷𝜷𝒔𝒔𝑨𝑨𝒋𝒋)
∑ (exp (𝜷𝜷𝒔𝒔𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊)𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  
Class probabilities are estimated with a multinomial logit model: 
(6)    Pr {𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑡𝑡} =  exp (𝜸𝜸𝒕𝒕𝒁𝒁)
∑ (exp (𝜸𝜸𝒔𝒔𝒁𝒁)𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠=1  
where 𝒁𝒁 are individual specific variables and 𝜸𝜸𝒕𝒕 the corresponding parameters. 
The unconditional choice probability is then  
(7)   Pr {𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑗𝑗) =  ∑ exp (𝜸𝜸𝒕𝒕𝒁𝒁)
∑ (exp (𝜸𝜸𝒔𝒔𝒁𝒁)𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠=1 ∗ exp (𝜷𝜷𝒔𝒔𝑨𝑨𝒋𝒋)∑ (exp (𝜷𝜷𝒔𝒔𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊)𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠=1 . 
The number of classes is decided by the researcher, based on statistical measures of fit 
such as Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) or Consistent Akaike Information 
Criterion (CAIC).  
3.3 Statistical Design 
Here, statistical design refers to the alignment of attribute levels for each alternative 
and Choice Set. The best possible design is a full factorial one, including all possible 
combinations of levels and alternatives. Various methods (Rose and Bliemer 2008; 
Street and Burgess 2007; Street et al. 2005) can be applied to reduce the number of 
possible combinations. Important concepts here are orthogonality, meaning that 
attributes are uncorrelated, and balance, where each level of an attribute appears with 
the same frequency. Designs which are orthogonal and balanced are called orthogonal 
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arrays, which do not confound the main effects. As interaction effects may be 
confounded with main effects and other interaction effects, extending the design with 
a fold-over avoids confounding of two-way interaction effects. The fold-over mirrors 
the design with opposite values for the levels.  
4 Questionnaire and Choice Experiment  
4.1 Attribute Choice and Choice Sets 
Starting with an initial list of nine attributes, we reduced their number through pre-
studies and pre-tests, following the procedure suggested by Coast et al. (2012). 
Through an expert interview with a representative of a consumer service website and 
additional interviews with representatives of energy cooperatives and consumers, we 
then identified the most relevant attributes with respect to utility governance.  
As discussed in section 2, three attributes are particularly important with respect to 
cooperative governance and retail electricity markets – price transparency, 
participation rights, and location – and decision making is a distinct cooperative 
governance attribute that helps to further specify the participation attribute.3 In 
cooperatives, each member has one vote, in contrast to voting rights based on equity 
in IOFs. The power of a cooperative member is, thus, also related to the number of 
owners of the organization. The more owners the organization has, the lower is the 
impact of one particular member in a democratically controlled enterprise. Share of 
renewable energy and price complete the attribute list. Price is presented in Eurocents 
per kWh – the form German consumers are most familiar with. We identified two 
3 Participation, as an attribute, here refers to the fundamental possibility of participation, whereas 
democratic decision making refers to the way decisions are made.  
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extreme levels of between 15 and 30 Eurocents per kWh as the minimum and 
maximum tariffs4, which we then divided into five Eurocent steps. Price levels were 
selected in a way to have an impact on choice, but they also should not have completely 
dominated it. A summary of the seven attributes and the levels used in the CE is 
provided in Table 2. 
Table 2: Description of Attributes and Levels 
Attribute Description  Levels Coding 
Transparency How a firm communicates 
pricing policy 
Full price transparency 0 
Statutory price 
transparency 
1 
Participation  Consumer participation in a 
firm’s decision-making 
process 
Possible 0 
Impossible 1 
Decision 
Making 
How a firm makes internal 
decisions  
One member one vote; 0 
Proportionate to equity 1 
Location Distance of company’s 
Headquarters to customers 
Non-local (outside 30 km 
radius) 
0 
Local (radius of 30 km); 1 
Owners Number of people sharing 
company ownership 
1-9; 10-99; 100-999; 
>1000 
Dummy 
Coded 
Renewables  Share of renewable energy  0%; 33.3%; 66.6%; 
100% 
Dummy 
Coded 
Price Price per kWh in Eurocents 15; 20; 25; 30 0; 1; 2; 3 
 
Respondents were likely to have different tariffs; a common status quo alternative was, 
thus, not realistic. An opt-out option (i.e. neither alternative is chosen) would also not 
have been useful, because all respondents consume electricity. Hence, we decided on 
choice sets with two alternatives and no opt-out or status quo option, explaining to 
4 We used a consumer website to identify minimum and maximum price levels based on average tariffs, 
including fixed monthly costs, special offers, and prepaid packages. 
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participants that these alternatives would result from a hypothetical search for a new 
electricity supplier, a procedure commonly applied in CEs in network industries 
(Hensher et al. 2005).  
The final experimental design consisted of an orthogonal array with its fold-over, 
generated with the software package NGENE (ChoiceMetrics 2012) and finally 
comprised of 48 Choice Sets arranged into four blocks. Each respondent was asked to 
fill in one randomly assigned block of twelve Choice Sets with two alternatives each. 
4.2 Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
We implemented the questionnaire and CE using Unipark, an online environment for 
survey research. Respondents were recruited through mailing lists of the universities 
of the authors, covering students and employees. A link was sent to potential 
participants requesting that they take part in an approximately 15 minute-long online 
survey. 
We are aware of the bias introduced by this sampling process. Data obtained from such 
non-probability sampling cannot be statistically generalized, thus the procedure 
demands additional justification. When only certain members of a population are of 
interest, non-probability sampling targeted at specific sub-populations may be the best 
available alternative to achieve a sufficiently large number of observations. In cases 
where a problem is relatively under-researched, a small and easily available sample 
may be a good starting point for initially exploring it (Henry 1990, p.23f.). In addition, 
the costs for sampling conveniently available respondents are substantially lower.5 Our 
reasoning for recruiting subjects via non-probability sampling was motivated by a mix 
5 For further information on the merits and demerits of non-probability sampling and an overview on 
different sampling designs, see Henry (1990, p.17ff.). 
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of these factors. Our sample is strongly biased towards highly educated, 
environmentally aware people. This bears the advantage that we have a larger chance 
that the respondents would understand the CE and that the attributes are more relevant 
than it would be with the overall population. In an explorative study like this, this point 
can be of critical importance. We had good reason to believe that the attributes of the 
CE would not be similarly relevant for all groups. For instance, interviews in the pre-
study indicated that “governance” plays a role especially for the young and those 
following an environmentally-friendly lifestyle. Similar evidence is available for pro-
environmental consumption choices in other contexts in Germany (Achtnicht 2011). 
It was, consequently, important to address the sampling bias by controlling for 
observed heterogeneity and by critically reflecting on potential confounding factors 
and selection bias (Henry 1990).  
The questionnaire began with a brief introductory text. Next, respondents were asked 
to provide some basic information, including income, age, and gender. Then the CE 
was introduced, with all attributes being described in detail. During the whole CE, 
attribute descriptions were available for respondents by drawing their mouse over 
attributes and levels. On each screen of the online survey, respondents could provide 
feedback and comments. From such qualitative comments, we can conclude that the 
level of understanding of the CE was generally good, even though in rare cases some 
attributes were not fully understood. In the next part of the questionnaire, respondents 
were presented with questions on their energy use and knowledge, including whether 
they have switched their supplier in the past or purchase renewable energies. The last 
part of the survey asked for environmental and political attitudes as well as knowledge 
and awareness of cooperatives. 
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The survey was conducted from 18 January 2012 to 27 February 2012. Out of the 886 
respondents who opened the online survey, 275 (31.04%) completed the questionnaire 
and 287 respondents completed or partly completed the CE. Summary statistics of key 
variables are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Survey Variables 
Name Description Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Sex = 1 if female 287 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Age Age in years 287 29.04 9.59 18 99 
Education Education on 
ordinal scale, 
with 1 = no 
formal 
education 
and 11 = 
post-
graduate 
degree 
285 7.69 2.01 1 11 
Income Monthly 
household 
income in 
Euros 
238 2,251.74 7,404.68 0.00 100,000.00 
Household 
size 
Number of 
people living 
in household 
287 2.22 1.23 1 11 
Special 
knowledge 
= 1 if 
respondent 
has 
background 
in electrical 
engineering 
etc. 
265 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Consumption  Electricity 
consumption 
per year in 
kWh 
134 2,557.28 3,203.10 1.27 35,000.00 
Expenditures  Electricity 
expenditure 
in Euros per 
month 
181 58.95 91.75 1.00 1,200.00 
Tariff Currently 
paid price in 
111 22.39 3.57 5.00 30.00 
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Eurocent per 
kWh 
Changed = 1 if 
respondent 
has changed 
supplier 
278 0.69 0.47 0 1 
Green Party  = 1 if 
respondent 
would vote 
for Green 
Party in next 
election 
287 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Transparent 5-point 
Likert scale 
ranking if the 
electricity 
market is 
perceived as 
transparent 
(1 = highest 
perceived 
transparency 
to 5 = lowest 
perceived 
transparency) 
230 4.08 0.95 1 5 
 
It can be seen that the gender ratio was balanced and respondents were relatively young 
and well-educated. Since education was measured on an ordinal scale, the mean of 
7.69 represents an undergraduate university or college degree. Households were 
relatively small and incomes mostly below the German average.6 One question asked 
about special knowledge on energy issues, such as having an engineering degree or 
participating in professional activities in the field. About 17 percent of the respondents 
had prior knowledge of energy issues. More than half of the respondents provided 
6 Two respondents indicated a monthly income of 50,000 and 100,000 Euros. Although these numbers 
seem exceptionally high, we have no reason to believe that respondents indicated false information. The 
same applies to the high electricity expenditures. We have, nonetheless, kept the data in the analysis. A 
drawback is the high number of zero incomes, often resulting from students living on scholarships or 
transfers. 
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some data on household energy consumption and costs, indicating good knowledge of 
prices and tariffs. On average, surveyed households consumed about 2,500 units per 
year, paid roughly 60 Euros a month, and purchased their electricity at 22 Eurocents 
per kWh. More than two thirds of the respondents have changed their electricity 
distribution company at least once. About 40 percent would vote for the Green Party 
in future elections, which is extremely high compared to the average votes of less than 
ten per cent the Green party receives in elections. It is a clear indication that our sample 
is biased towards a more environmentally sensitive population. 
We also asked respondents whether they felt that the price setting of utilities is 
transparent. With an average of more than four, respondents seem to perceive pricing 
as highly non-transparent.  
5 Results  
5.1  Conditional Logit and Latent Class Logit Results  
Table 4 reports results of three specifications of the CL model.  
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Table 4: Estimation Results Conditional Logit models 
 Basic Interactions Interactions & 
Ln (Income) 
Transparency -0.770*** -0.713*** -0.759*** 
 (-8.84) (-7.21) (-7.21) 
Participation -0.537*** 0.975* 1.026* 
 (-5.88) (1.93) (1.87) 
Decision Making -0.0309 -0.091 -0.039 
 (-0.36) (-0.90) (-0.37) 
Location 0.787*** 0.796*** 0.752*** 
 (7.96) (6.96) (6.41) 
Owners_10-99 0.156 0.228* 0.306** 
 (1.32) (1.65) (2.09) 
Owners_100-999 0.143 0.158 0.169 
 (1.43) (1.33) (1.29) 
Owners_>1000 0.0699 0.170 0.311** 
 (0.55) (1.15) (2.06) 
Renewables_33% 1.944*** 1.785*** 1.857*** 
 (14.04) (6.67) (5.89) 
Renewables_66% 3.039*** 2.856*** 3.395*** 
 (21.50) (6.22) (5.93) 
Renewables_100% 4.699*** 4.336*** 5.045*** 
 (23.54) (6.34) (5.95) 
Price -1.055*** -1.055***  
 (-20.89) (-18.21)  
Participation x Age  -0.025*** -0.024** 
  (-2.73) (-2.32) 
Participation x 
Transparent 
 -0.214** -0.205* 
  (-2.19) (-1.84) 
Renewables x Changed  0.410*** 0.340*** 
  (4.72) (3.47) 
Renewables x Green 
Party 
 0.504*** 0.562*** 
  (5.38) (5.32) 
Renewables x  -0.061 -0.151** 
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Transparent 
  (-1.23) (-2.39) 
Price/Ln(Income)   -1.226*** 
   (-16.13) 
Respondents 287 225 187 
Observations 3404  2702 2249 
Pseudo R2 0.484 0.513 0.499 
χ² 2284.8*** 1920.8*** 1554.3*** 
Log Likelihood (Null) -2359.5 -1872.9 -1558.9 
Log Likelihood -1217.1 -912.5 -781.7 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
The first model is basic, including only the attributes. In the second model, we added 
interaction variables of socio-demographic and attitude data with attributes. The third 
model also includes an adjusted price attribute. Dividing the price attribute by the 
logarithm of income allows variation in the marginal utility of income across 
respondents. 
As indicated by the χ²-statistics, all models are statistically significant at the one 
percent level. The attribute coefficients display the expected signs. Transparency, 
Participation and Decision Making have negative coefficients, meaning that 
respondents prefer more price transparency over less, possibilities of participation over 
non-participation, and democratic decision making. Location has a positive sign, 
implying that local distribution companies are preferred. The Owners dummies are all 
positive. Companies with a higher number of owners are preferred. The same applies 
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to the Renewables dummies, revealing a preference for higher share of renewable 
energy.7  
The negative coefficient for Price indicates that, as expected, lower tariffs are preferred 
over higher. In model 1, all coefficients are statistically significant except Decision 
Making and the Owners dummies, which are also not jointly statistically significant. 
In model 2, we included four interaction terms to derive inferences about the influence 
of case-specific variables on attributes. Our sample is (intentionally) biased towards 
the young, Green Party voters, and consumers with experience in switching suppliers. 
Thus, we have specifically controlled for these socio-demographic and attitudinal 
sample-selection biases by interacting Age with Participation, Perception of price-
setting transparency with Participation and Renewables, and Green Party and 
Company Changed with Renewables. The negative sign of the Participation x Age 
coefficient indicates that, with increasing age, participation becomes more important. 
The negative sign of Participation x Transparent implies that people perceiving price 
setting as non-transparent become more interested in participation.8  
Respondents who had changed suppliers, would vote for the Green Party, and rated 
price setting in the electricity market as transparent exhibit a stronger preference for 
renewable energies. Model 3 shows that higher-income respondents care less about 
7 We tested for a linear trend in utility in the basic CL model. The Wald test results indicate that the 
coefficients are statistically significantly different. H0: Slope zero to 33% = Slope 33% to 66%: p = 
0.0002; H0: Slope 33% to 66% = Slope 66% to 100%: p = 0.39; H0: Slope zero to 33% = Slope 66% to 
100%: p = 0.0001; H0: All slopes equal: p = 0.0005. 
8 It should be noted that the sign for Participation changes because the marginal effect of the attribute 
on utility is not β but β – αz, where z is the case-specific variable and α is the corresponding parameter. 
Taking the means of the two interaction variables will lead to a marginal effect for Participation of -
0.611, which is close to the marginal effect in the basic model of -0.537. It is worth mentioning that 
respondents of the average sample age, 29, who regard the electricity market as transparent would have 
a small positive marginal effect. Hence, they would prefer that participation not be possible.  
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price. The marginal effect of Price, which can be interpreted as a change in income 
and, hence, is its marginal utility, is calculated as βprice divided by ln(Income).9  
In order to account for unobserved heterogeneity, we use a LCL model. In this model, 
we assume discrete distribution of preferences. We decided for a three class model 
based on first, an observation of the plausibility of the results and second on BIC. Table 
5 shows the log likelihood values, BIC, as well as AIC and CAIC for LCL models 
from two to six classes. The CAIC punishes an increase in parameters, which lead to 
the lowest value in the two class model. The BIC tends towards a three class model 
and the AIC to a five class model. However, we will report the results of the three class 
model as it turned out useful in the interpretation of the data. 
 
Table 5: Information Criteria of LCL models. 
Classes LLF Nparam CAIC BIC AIC 
2 670.092 28 1526.552 1498.552 1396.184 
3 620.987 45 1541.493 1496.493 1331.973 
4 592.968 62 1598.608 1536.608 1309.937 
5 572.076 79 1669.976 1590.976 1302.152 
6 576.231 96 1791.438 1695.438 1344.463 
 
9 Note that the lower number of observations results from the large number of zero income observations 
which drop out of the estimation in model 3. Given that the coefficients of model 2 and model 3 are 
fairly close, this change in sample does not seem to introduce a selection bias. 
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Table 6: Estimation Results Latent Class Logit Model 
 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 
Transparency -4.396*** 0.137 -0.734*** 
 (-4.73) (0.34) (-4.27) 
Participation -8.944*** -0.836** -0.155 
 (-4.60) (-2.42) (-0.91) 
Decision Making 3.181*** -1.163** -0.339* 
 (2.84) (-2.55) (-1.90) 
Location 9.868*** 1.224*** 0.788*** 
 (4.24) (3.31) (4.02) 
Owners_10-99 2.372*** -0.158 0.537** 
 (2.98) (-0.33) (2.02) 
Owners_100-999 -1.412*** 0.450 0.005 
 (-2.74) (1.05) (0.02) 
Owners_>1000 0.711 -0.079 0.666*** 
 (0.82) (-0.14) (2.95) 
Renewables_33% 8.905*** 1.954*** 1.243*** 
 (6.71) (3.12) (5.15) 
Renewables_66% 19.25*** 2.027*** 2.758*** 
 (5.92) (3.75) (9.82) 
Renewables_100% 27.66*** 3.219*** 4.005*** 
 (6.27) (3.56) (12.57) 
Price -5.904*** -2.714*** -0.247*** 
 (-5.88) (-7.19) (-3.41) 
Class Share 0.499 0.210 0.291 
Respondents 287 287 287 
Observations 3404 3404   3404 
Pseudo R2 0.806 0.715 0.453 
χ² 1253.1*** 467.5*** 412.4*** 
Log Likelihood (Null) -777.4 -326.8 -454.7 
Log Likelihood -150.8 -93.04 -248.5 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 6 presents estimation results of a three-class LCL model. The overall model is 
statistically significant at the one percent level. Class 1 is the largest, with a share of 
50 percent. Classes 2 and 3 have shares of 21 and 29 percent, respectively.  
The coefficient of Transparency is large, negative, and statistically significant in Class 
1; smaller, yet also statistically significant, in Class 3; and close to zero in Class 2. 
Participation has the expected negative sign in all classes, but is particularly large and 
statistically significant at the one percent level in Class 1. Members of Class 1 also 
prefer Decision Making proportionate to equity. In all three classes, local utilities are 
preferred over distant ones, with a particularly large coefficient in Class 1. Coefficients 
of the Owners dummies are jointly significant at the one percent level in Class 1 and 
Class 3. In both cases, companies with either a few or many members are preferred. 
The Renewables dummies and Price are highly significant in all classes and display 
the expected signs. In the LCL estimation, we included case-specific variables in the 
membership function to account for observed heterogeneity.  
Table 7: LCL Membership Function 
Variable Class1 Class2  
    
Age -0.036 0.039  
Changed -1.036 -1.343  
Green Party 0.987 -1.364  
Transparent 0.215 0.064  
Ln(Income) 0.758 0.726  
Constant -4.451 -5.67  
 
Class 3 is the base category, for which values are zero. Younger people are more likely 
to be members of Class 1 and less likely members of Class 2. Those who have already 
changed distribution companies are more likely to be members of Class 3. Green Party 
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voters are more likely to be members of Class 1 and less likely to belong to Class 2. 
Those who perceive the price setting as non-transparent and richer people are also 
more likely to be members of Class 1 and 2. 
5.2 Willingness to pay analysis 
Table 8 provides estimates and confidence intervals for WTP for all estimated models. 
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Table 8: Confidence intervals (95 percent) for WTP values by models 
 CL Basic Model LCL Three-Class Model 
 
 
Class 1 
green participators 
Class 2 
price conscious democrats 
Class 3 
change makers 
 WTP lower upper WTP lower  upper WTP lower  upper WTP lower  upper 
Transparency -3.65 -4.50 -2.79 -3.72 -4.31 -3.13 0.25 -1.15 1.66 -14.86 -26.54 -3.17 
Participation -2.54 -3.33 -1.75 -7.57 -8.68 -6.46 -1.54 -2.72 -0.35 -3.13 -9.60 3.32 
Decision Making -0.14 -0.94 0.64 2.69 1.33 4.05 -2.14 -3.42 -0.86 -6.85 -15.27 1.55 
Location 3.72 2.79 4.65 8.35 6.48 10.23 2.25 0.88 3.62 15.94 5.58 26.30 
Owners_10-99  0.74 -0.35 1.83 2.00 0.92 3.09 -0.29 -2.03 1.45 10.86 -0.912 22.63 
Owners_100-999  0.68 -0.25 1.61 -1.19 -2.01 -0.38 0.82 -0.69 2.35 0.09 -10.14 10.33 
Owners_>1000 0.33 -0.85 1.52 0.60 -0.78 1.99 -0.14 -2.13 1.84 13.47 2.13 24.82 
Renewables_33%  9.21 8.14 10.26 7.54 6.50 8.58 3.59 1.83 5.36 25.15 9.82 40.48 
Renewables_66% 14.40 13.15 15.64 16.29 14.70 17.89 3.73 2.06 5.40 55.81 23.97 87.66 
Renewables_100% 22.26 20.91 23.61 23.42 22.34 24.50 5.92 3.44 8.41 81.04 36.08 126.01 
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WTP values are calculated by dividing attribute coefficient by Price coefficient. 
Resulting values indicate the monetary amounts respondents are willing to pay for 
marginal improvement in an attribute. Upper and lower limits form the confidence 
intervals of WTP values, calculated with the delta method (Hole 2007) at a 95% 
confidence level. The larger the gaps are between these limits, the noisier the data. 
A WTP value of 3.72 for Location in the first column, for example, means that, on 
average, respondents are willing to pay an additional 3.72 Eurocent per kWh for 
regional suppliers. For a change from statuary price transparency to full price 
transparency, respondents are willing to pay 3.65 Eurocent per kWh. For the two four-
level attributes, the reference category is the first level. For an increase from zero to a 
33% share of renewable energy, respondents are willing to pay 9.21 Eurocent; for an 
increase from zero to 66%, the WTP is 14.4 Eurocent. The WTP for increasing from 
33% to 66% is, thus, 5.19 Eurocent. 
It turns out that, on average, Renewables and Price dominate the choices and contribute 
to the largest share of utility, followed by Location, Transparency and Participation. 
In the LCL model, members of Class 1 put special emphasis on renewable energy, 
locally produced power, and right to participate in the decision making process. 
Therefore we name this class “green participators”. Respondents from Class 2 are 
characterized by rather low WTP values, but show a preference for locally produced 
power and renewable energy. Respondents in Class 2 also have a positive WTP for 
democratic decision making that lies within the 95% confidence interval. This class 
can be described as the “price conscious democrats”. Class 3 is marked by cost 
insensitivity and displays very high WTP values, especially for Renewables. The other 
important attributes for this group are Transparency and Location. We name this class 
“change makers”. 
25 
 
6 Discussion 
Overall, our findings indicate that the most important attributes for respondents are 
Price and Renewables but lower WTP also exists for the governance attributes 
Transparency, Participation, and Location. The Owners attribute is not decisive; with 
respect to Decision Making, only members of Class 2 have a statistically significant 
higher WTP of about two Eurocents.  
Overall, coefficient signs and WTP values of the governance attributes are in line with 
the Transaction Cost Economics framework we have developed. Locally produced 
electricity may reduce information and enforcement costs. Consumers can more easily 
observe how their energy is produced, which creates trust. An alternative explanation 
may be distrust towards large IOFs. Participation possibilities are important as well. 
The implied user-owner identity can be a valuable mechanism to protect against 
market-power abuse by former monopolists. Likewise, price transparency is valued 
highly. Given the credence good characteristics of electricity, this mechanism can 
reduce information costs and quality uncertainty. It should be clear by now that 
cooperatives are inherently advantageous in this respect. Nonetheless, transparent 
pricing could be mimicked by non-cooperative electric utilities. 
Democratic decision making is the only distinct cooperative governance mechanism 
included in our CE. In the basic model, it is not statistically significantly different from 
zero. In the LCL model, our results indicate a positive and statistically significant WTP 
only for Class 2, representing one fifth of the sample. For Class 1, representing half of 
the respondents, democratically controlled utilities seem actually less attractive; we 
speculate that these respondents perceive the one member, one vote principle as 
inefficient or outdated.  
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Of course, the negative effect of Decision Making in Class 1 does not imply that 
consumers pay less for electricity from cooperatives. WTP for the other typical 
cooperative attributes appear to outrank the rather small effects of Decision Making in 
Class 1. In Germany, electricity supply cooperatives are mainly engaged in the field 
of renewable energy. One important finding of our research is, thus, that price 
premiums paid for electricity from cooperatives can to a large extent be attributed to 
consumer WTP for renewable energies.  
As any other method, CEs have strengths and weaknesses. As a Stated Preferences 
Method, they are subject to hypothetical bias and strategic behavior (see e.g. Hensher 
2010; Murphy et al. 2005). Further, CEs assume full rationality of respondents, based 
on assumptions of neoclassical economic demand theory. In practice, however, 
rationality requirements are limited to the choice task: the required information is listed 
in the attributes and rationality is reduced to choosing the best option. Compared to 
choices in the real world, CEs are fairly simple. It should be noted that the complexity 
of real-life decision making cannot be compared to the online survey used here. The 
particular strength of the CE method lies in its ability to single out the valuation of 
particular attributes, which has proven useful for the problem studied in this paper. 
The extremely high WTP of up to 80 Eurocent per kWh may, however, also point 
towards some problems with the biased sample and the hypothetical setting 
respondents were placed in. WTP for Participation increases with age. But, as our 
sample is biased towards the young, the average effect is likely over-estimated and can 
be corrected by using the respective coefficients provided in Table 4. The same applies 
to Green Party voters and people with experience in changing suppliers. Both variables 
interact with the coefficients of the renewable energy estimate, and respondents seem 
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over-represented compared to the general population. Correcting for this observed 
heterogeneity would result in lower estimates for WTP for renewable energy.  
Ultimately, it would be worth repeating the CE with a random sample of the general 
population or a consumer panel to control for unobserved heterogeneity and possibly 
derive more robust recommendations for utilities. In our limited sample, consumer 
WTP for renewable energy is substantial, a result also found in other empirical studies, 
which we have supplemented by focusing on WTP for the organization of the retail 
electricity consumption process. In principle, utilities could adapt more transparent 
policies or engage in local production to attract additional customers or to set higher 
tariffs. But just how far companies are really willing to take consumer demands into 
account and what the particular costs of such reforms might be, require substantiation 
through further research. 
7 Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper, we have investigated whether Cooperative Governance attributes 
contribute to greater WTP for electricity. From a theoretical perspective, we have 
argued that these attributes can solve contemporary electricity-market challenges. To 
address this question empirically, we conducted an online CE with a convenience 
sample of 287 respondents. Our results show that respondents have a particularly high 
WTP for renewable energies, but full price transparency, possibility to participate, and 
company proximity also increased their WTP. Although we find that supplier 
governance matters, we did not find strong evidence that respondents support 
democratic decision making as practiced in cooperatives. WTP varies substantially 
with age, income, past change of supplier and perception of market transparency. 
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Using an LCL model, we have identified three classes of consumers, varying strongly 
in magnitude and direction of preferences. 
Our analysis here has focused on the role of consumers. Other important aspects in the 
German debate on energy transition – notably the highly disputed Renewable Energy 
Act – have been neglected. Also, in most countries, cooperatives fall under a 
completely different legal framework and are subject to different taxation than in 
Germany. International comparison of such conditions on the production side may 
generate valuable insights on consumer influence in shaping the organization of an 
economy’s energy system. At this stage, our findings suggest that consumers in 
Germany do play a role in the energy system, especially by creating additional demand 
for renewable energies, though their importance in affecting the organization of the 
system seems to be relatively small. Whether such governance characteristics can play 
a critical role on the production side requires further research. 
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